🔒 fix: patch CodeQL XSS (#1) and path-injection (#2) alerts - #6
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… static server Resolves two CodeQL code-scanning alerts. js/xss (public/index.html): appendAuditEntry built the audit row via innerHTML, and the attacker-controlled `entry.source` was concatenated raw into a class attribute (`sourceClass`) with no escaping. A crafted `source` could break out of the attribute and inject markup. Rebuild the row with createElement + textContent so untrusted values can never be parsed as HTML, and restrict the source-derived CSS class to a safe token. js/path-injection (server.js): serveStatic relied on a startsWith guard over a path.join result, which does not decode %2e%2e or collapse encoded traversal. Decode the URL, strip the query, normalize, resolve against publicDir, and reject anything escaping the root. Verified: npm test 25/25; traversal probes (/../server.js, /%2e%2e/server.js, encoded variants) all 404 while normal assets serve; injected audit payload renders as inert text with no script execution.
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Resolves the two open CodeQL code-scanning alerts. Independent of PRs #4/#5; branched from current
origin/main.Alert #2 —
js/path-injection(server.js:89) — FIXEDThe static handler guarded traversal with
!filePath.startsWith(publicDir)over apath.joinresult. That guard doesn't decode%2e%2eor collapse encoded traversal, so it's known-weak. Now the handler:new URL(...).pathname+decodeURIComponent)path.posix.normalizes the path, resolves it againstpublicDirwithpath.resolvepublicDirMalformed encoding returns 400.
Alert #1 —
js/xss(public/index.html:605) — FIXED (real, not a false positive)appendAuditEntrybuilt the row viainnerHTML. Most values passed throughesc(), but the attacker-controlledentry.sourcewas concatenated raw into aclassattribute:sourceoriginates from the unauthenticatedPOST /api/eventsbody, so a crafted value like"><img src=x onerror=...>breaks out of the attribute. (esc()istextContent→innerHTML, which doesn't escape quotes, so wrapping wouldn't have fully fixed the attribute context either.)Fix: rebuild the row with
createElement+textContent(noinnerHTML), and restrict the source-derived class to a safe token ([^a-zA-Z0-9_-]→-). Legitimate source classes (audit-source-agent-gateway,-agent-platform,-user) are unchanged, so styling is preserved.Verification
npm test→ 25/25 pass--path-as-is):/../server.js,/../../server.js,/%2e%2e/server.js,/..%2f..%2fserver.js,/../translate.js,/../../etc/passwd→ all 404, no source leaked. Normal assets (/,/index.html,/topology.js,/theme.css,/registry-panel.js,/./index.html) → 200.source='"><img src=x onerror=...>'and a<script>summary → no script executed, 0 injectedimg/script/belements, values rendered as inert text, legit class styling intact.No inline suppressions added; no existing behavior weakened.